Introduction
A new concept has emerged over the past decade in the discussion of the media's impact on politics, society, and culture: mediatization. Mediatization research tries to analyze the dynamics of our increasingly media-saturated and media-driven societies, which are especially evident in high modern societies. Stig Hjarvard has defined mediatization as "the process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the operations of social institutions (family, work, politics, etc.) while at the same time acquiring the status of a social institution in their own right." 2 Two objections, in particular, have been raised in connection with this new terminology and concept. The first is that this inquiry into the centrality of the media has been the focus of media research all along, which highlights that mediatization has a long history. We need to think about mediatization in similar ways as other long-term-but distinct-developments such as globalization. Neither one of these processes is historically speaking new, yet both of them have accelerated to such a degree that their effects have become ever more apparent and profound. As Friedrich Krotz pointed out, "Mediatization thus should be defined as a historical, ongoing, long-term development in which more and more media emerge and are institutionalized." The transition from stone tablets to papyrus, the invention of the printing press or the emergence of the electronic media are all earlier parts of this historical process. For many media scholars, mediatization is a grand concept on par with others such as commercialization, individualization and globalization, and they believe that it will become just as broadly recognized and applied. 3 The second objection has been raised primarily by British media scholars. Are the new terms, "mediatization" and "mediatized society," really superior to the established concepts of "mediation" and "mediated society," they ask? Mediatization scholars argue that the new terms are better suited to capture the broader processes implied in current media developments.
Mediation, for example, is often used to describe direct, face-to-face communication or can be used to describe the relatively neutral process of relaying information. Utilizing the mediatization paradigm is better suited to analyze the increasingly complex and ubiquitous ways by which the media impact our lives. Gianpietro Mazzoleni put it most succinctly: "In brief, the concept of 'mediatization of society' indicates an extension of the influence of the media into all societal spheres." 4 Based on the thrust of current media research, it seems certain that the concept of mediatization is here to stay. In fact, its usage is rapidly accelerating-in no small part driven by the dynamic expansion of the new media and their ever increasing applications.
Whether we look at the development of online banking and online newspapers, the accelerating utilization of media and PR campaigns in politics or the transformation of personal communication, leisure and our work environments, we are all subject to the expanding dynamics of mediatization.
The goal of this article is to analyze the media coverage during wartime within the context of the mediatization paradigm. War and war reporting, like other sectors of our highly modern societies, have indeed become mediatized, and this history goes back a long way. 5 In his study on war imagery, Gerhard Paul identified World War I as the first mediatized war. This war saw the development of large propaganda organizations in all combatant countries. Due to the vast expansion of newspapers and magazines as well as the development of film and radio broadcasting, government agencies were able to disseminate their propaganda swiftly and effectively. The professionalization of advertising and the strict censorship of news media were additional aspects of this initial mediatization of war. 6 During World War II, these developments were further heightened and perfected. Hitler's use of propaganda and the media are well known.
In the United States as well, news censorship flourished even as new information modes such as live overseas broadcasts became feasible. More often than not, American propaganda was privatized, carried out by commercial advertising and media professionals and seamlessly inserted into radio broadcasts, mainstream films and popular magazines. The opening segment set the tone: "The technical equipment, the firepower and thereby the might of the Americans was never more apparent than in the spring of 1966. Never was America further away from losing this war-and never further away from winning it." The reporter predicted that the United States would have to send one million soldiers to Vietnam in order to effectively turn the tide of war and doubted that this was politically feasible. 19 This was a remarkable piece of reporting both for its blunt assessment and its questioning analysis, especially in early 1966 when West German media were toeing the official government line. This evolution towards a more critical reporting in West Germany in the late 1960s was part of a veritable media revolution. As Christina von Hodenberg has demonstrated, the West German public sphere had undergone "a rapid politicization which was part of the ongoing socio-cultural democratization of the Federal Republic." As younger, more engaged journalists were coming of age and were taking over the newsrooms in West Germany, the public tenor shifted rather swiftly from consensus to conflict. Critical reporting which challenged established mainstream views now became the new norm. The "consensus journalism" of the 1950s was swept out. A final sign of this novel news ethos and critical reporting was that the new generation of journalists actually welcomed the protests and rebellion, which they saw as part and parcel of a critical public sphere long overdue in West Germany. This comparison between the media coverage in the two countries further calls into question the power of television reporting as a cause for the increasing opposition to the war.
The impact of "the living room war" on the West German public was far more muted than that in the United States, and yet the opposition against the war increased just as much. This adds further credence to the argument that the TV coverage accelerated opposition to the war, yet it did not cause America's military defeat. 27 In many ways, this accelerator effect of the media and television coverage was similar to other mediatized conflicts of the 1960s. As Todd Gitlin has highlighted, the student movement was propelled towards ever more spectacular demonstrations, which ultimately led to the celebrity of the few at the cost of the organizational cohesion of the movement. Likewise, the Civil Rights Movement partially relied on the use of "dramaturgical" framing of their demonstrations, knowing full well that the racist outbursts against nonviolent protestors would be captured by cameramen and replayed on American television screens. In both of these cases, the media accelerated emerging developments but neither created them nor decided the final outcome. In Germany, the tenor of the media coverage sounded very similar. One steady criticism was that the German media, television in particular, had relied too much on the CNN version of the war. Many analysts and journalists alike argued that the war coverage was largely devoid of serious news content. The media coverage had all the elements of a "macabre video game," they argued, which repeatedly showed successful smart bombs hitting their targets, yet shed no light on the collateral damage created by the vast majority of "un-smart" bombs. 33 Likewise, since the reporting was driven by commercial incentives, the dynamics of the coverage disintegrated into infotainment where the reality and brutality of war receded into the background. 34 The Gulf War of 1991 was the last war in which the military could effectively control the media and almost completely dominate the international coverage. In the media environment of the 21 st century, this level of military censorship is no longer possible. In little more than ten years, mediatization took a quantum leap forward, largely due to the development of the internet and social media, new cell phone and satellite technology as well as the emergence of global rival news networks. As a result, mediatized war would never be the same.
Media Coverage of the Iraq War in Germany and the United States
Germany was one of many European countries that did not join the American-led German media severely criticized this new strategy and predicted that it would lead to biased and one-sided reporting. This general suspicion was further supported by a widely reported incident when an embedded journalist for the German RTL TV channel slipped into a casual "we" while reporting the advance of an American unit: "We have the most modern military equipment in the world." 37 The second major distinction of the German TV coverage of the Iraq War was the purposefully broad and varied use of foreign media footage. Instead of relying solely on CNN or American footage, German TV stations drew from multiple foreign sources to present a more nuanced picture of the war: nearly 40% came from U.S. and British channels, slightly more than 40% originated from Arab news channels and about 15% of coverage relied on Iraqi sources.
Small percentages also came from Iran, France and Turkey. Most surprising is the fact that the inclusion of American footage was slightly less frequent than news from Arab stations, mainly
Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV. The most important factor driving this development was the deliberate decision by the German media not to overlook the civilian victims and the "collateral" damage, and Arab media were most inclined to highlight this aspect of the war. 38 The third factor which provided a constant check on German TV coverage was that print as William Dorman has pointed out, "critical thinking in any society, free or not, becomes virtually impossible." Whether one calls it groupthink or the power of political and ideological consensus, the dynamics of these forces are hard to challenge. 45 A wide variety of factors have further increased this pervasive trend. The ratings war and shrinking newspaper readership have reduced the ability of journalists to challenge politicians on issues which enjoy wide popular support. In addition, the White House pursued an aggressive communications strategy which gradually built a solid consensus behind the war, and anyone who dared question the evidence was targeted, marginalized or ostracized. Lastly, in the aftermath of 9/11 the volatility of the country and the patriotism which permeated every aspect of the national culture played directly into the hands of war proponents and gave them additional leverage. 46 Finally, the American media system has always worked best within a functioning, oppositional political framework. As the reporting on the Vietnam War highlighted, the majority of the media shifted its reporting in tandem with the increasing opposition to the war. Not coincidentally, the "golden age of journalism" in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s was also a time period of deep disagreement about the political priorities of the nation, which provided cover for a more critical and oppositional media. The new global media rivalry has forever changed how future wars will be covered. As The best governments can hope for is to shape global and domestic public opinion in their favor by dominating the war coverage with favorable footage. The new wartime trend is towards "information warfare," which includes both "informational operations" and "perception management." The ultimate goal is to dominate the communications networks and to utilize the media to one's own advantage.
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In connection with the Iraq War, the core issue which has emerged as one of the main media controversy was the Pentagon strategy of embedding reporters with coalition troops.
While not entirely new, this integration of journalists with army units was planned far ahead and reflected the realization on the part of the U.S. Defense Department that it would not be able to recreate the pool system of the first Gulf War. The military planners took their chances hoping that the embedding of reporters would provide a steady stream of riveting, positive images of the military campaign. As most observers agree, the strategy proved successful. When it came to feeding the unrelenting 24-hour news media cycle, the strategy of embedding journalists satisfied this media appetite and proved effective in delivering popular footage. Yet is also created a partial illusion of war and narrowly focused reports which lacked both context and analysis. 53 The third major shift in the nature of mediatized war is the development and increasing significance of the Internet and the social media. Together with the three broad transformations discussed earlier, they highlight that we have indeed entered a new stage of mediatized war. As the New York Times commented, we have seen "the first real war of the Information Age." 56 While some of these developments, especially the impact of the internet, are still in the early stages, it has provided us with a glimpse into the nature of future mediatized warfare.
Conclusion
Mediatization is an ongoing historical development and accelerating process which is reshaping our society, politics and everyday lives by making the media ever more powerful and This article has analyzed the accelerated mediatization of war over the past fifty years.
The focus was on a comparative view of the media coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars in the United States and Germany. The purpose of this historical and comparative approach was to identify some of the patterns of the mediatization of war while simultaneously recognizing particular national characteristics. As this study shows, the developments are neither uniform nor unidirectional, depending on the cultural and historical circumstances.
What does all of this mean for the future relationship between the media, the public and governments before and during wartime? We can draw some significant parallels between the mediatization of war and the mediatization of politics here. In their research, Gianpietro investigation. Yet is also leaves us with the important reminder that neither the media nor the dynamic forces of mediatization will be sufficient to prevent the next war of choice. 
